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Risky Business
Rupert Read and David Burnham on what philosophy can tell us about dealing with uncertainty,
systemic risk, and potential catastrophe
The Philippines Supreme Court recently made a worldwide landmark decision, from a
jurisprudential point of view, invoking for the ﬁrst time ever the precautionary principle as a
decisive basis for acting against GM crops. This decision has come under ﬁre from scientists in
the Philippines and America for being ‘anti-science’, but it has also been strongly defended. The
defence throws up an issue of interest for philosophers, as the case for the defence prominently
invokes recent work on the precautionary principle.
Ever since the precautionary principle was ﬁrst invented, critics have argued that it is merely a
naïve and blunt instrument for blocking policy that various lobby groups do not approve of. One of
its earliest and most inﬂuential forms, the Rio Declaration of 1992, states the principle as ‘where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.This
statement of the principle sums up its basic intent fairly well; however, it leads to problems in some
respects, notably by virtue of introducing the non-instantiated concept of ‘full scientiﬁc certainty’.
This sets the bar too high, and so makes it appear as though the precautionary principle will
always be relevant.
Helpfully, the recent Inquirer article from the Philippines Supreme Court case suggests how the
precautionary principle can be reformulated so as to avoid such problems, namely, via the new
and improved version of the precautionary principle put forward by Read et al. Unlike many other
deﬁnitions of the precautionary principle, this paper provides a non-naïve, philosophically rigorous
approach to the problem of precaution and lays down clear guidelines as to when, and when not,
to apply it. It bridges the gap between precaution and evidentiary action (see below) by invoking
our ability to evaluate the difference between systemic, global risk and merely local, non-
catastrophic risk.
Broadly, Read et al. argue that the precautionary principle should only be invoked to settle an
issue (that is, it can only be a decisive consideration) in extreme situations, when the potential
harm is systemic and the possible consequences involve total and irreversible ruin, such as
extinction (human or otherwise). This is as opposed to situations where the risks are non-
propagating and merely local in scope.
It is essential to distinguish here between ordinary risk management and the precautionary
principle. We encounter risks almost every moment of every day, and these require managing. In
these cases, we typically know most of the variables and our calculations can take these into
account when deciding on the appropriate course of action. So too with many other run-of-the-mill
scientiﬁc or economic decisions: we more or less know the possible outcomes. And even if we do
not know the possible outcomes, we at least know something about their upper bound. For
example, the worst thing that can happen to one of us crossing a road is to get run over. If one is
run over, that’s very bad; but it’s not a catastrophe. The precautionary principle doesn’t therefore
recommend against crossing the road (though it would recommend against crossing the road
blindfolded, as it were). The precautionary principle is decisive when unavoidable uncertainty or
ignorance is involved, especially when one of the uncertain risks is the risk of ruin. For one cannot
calculate anything when a number of the variables are missing, have such a broad range that they
essentially say nothing, or have a potentially inﬁnite value.
The idea of ruin is a key point for making the precautionary principle salient. A system that
achieves (sic!) ruin cannot recover; in these cases, there is clear need for a precautionary
intervention, especially when the system that is at risk is one that plays a major role in vulnerable
ecosystems or in life on this planet. A key constituent of ruin is increased uncertainty, because as
uncertainty increases, so too does the scope for harm. Critics (‘sceptics’) often use this argument
to say that because there is uncertainty associated with, for instance, the evidence for man-made
climate change, the risks may be less than people think. This is true, but it neglects to mention that
the risks may, symmetrically, also be greatly increased (or they may lie anywhere in between). And
it is this ruinous case, where the risk is far greater than we could have known, that we need to be
determined to prevent.
One could suggest that this is merely an ideological point, that human beings are naturally risk-
takers and that we should let people make their own decisions instead of ‘hampering’ them with
this principle. But this is a misunderstanding of ruin. Ruin is not a mere possibility, it is a statistical
certainty if the action that is ruinous is continued. For example, if a human being jumps off a foot-
stool, he is very, very unlikely to die; but if he jumps off a twenty-storey building, he will surely die
—and even if he only jumps off a two-storey building enough times, he will die. There is a point
after which the system, in this case the human body, cannot absorb any more damage; in the case
of the planet, it might be after losing a particular percentage of biodiversity or perhaps the ocean-
acidity reaching a certain pH.
It is useful to dwell for a moment in a little detail on a concrete case. The risks and uncertainties
associated with genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) serve as an excellent example of where
the principle could and should be applied. GMOs represent a systemic risk to both human health
and various ecosystems. We have no truly long-term studies on any of the ‘tail’ risks to human
health or ecosystem health from GMOs, and it is as yet unclear how such studies could be
undertaken safely, outside the laboratory (and they would need to be undertaken outside the
laboratory, to demonstrate safety). The risk of complete ecosystem breakdown through collapse of
homogenized mega-monocultures and the connected risk of biodiversity collapse are risks it would
be reckless to take. Thus, Read et al. conclude, GMOs offer a clear and systemic risk of ruin.
It is often argued that the precautionary principle is merely negative, stiﬂing innovation. Contrary to
many critics’ claims along these lines, Read et al. argue that while it can be used to ban or stop
certain activities—for instance, certainly GMOs and possibly nuclear power—it can also be used to
prompt actions, such as further research or the implementation of one technology over another.
The hope is that this clariﬁcation of the principle will allow decision makers at all levels to discern
when and where to apply it. In the right hands, the versatility of the principle could make it aHome News Forthcoming Events theBlog thePodcasts Past Events About Us
Monday, 11 April 2016
lynchpin of modern policy decisions the world over, to keep us safe without stiﬂing innovation.
In recent years, the precautionary principle has also been seen in opposition to the ‘proactionary
principle’. The latter says that we should be proactive about pushing humanity forward into the
next technological age, allegedly the age of AI, even of ‘trans-humanism’. Its adherents argue that
we, as a species, should court risk as an inevitable part of our existence. However, the problem
with this is that it will inevitably generate ever more uncertainty, and would undermine completely
the process of building down of risk that a precautionary ethic recommends. In other words, if we
continue to take risky actions it would commit us to the ruin outlined above as a racing certainty.
Furthermore, it is unclear that the term ‘proactionary’ really makes much sense, if it is supposed to
pick out something opposed to the precautionary principle. For, as we have just laid out,
precautionary reasoning, properly understood, is proactionary: it involves acting to pre-empt
catastrophic threats, and such pre-emption can take the form of (for example) recommending new
research programmes or the proactive adoption of safe systems (for example, agro-ecology rather
than GM).
In conclusion, the fundamental point is this: Philosophers, like virtually everyone else nowadays,
tend to demand evidence when presented with a hypothesis. But most so-called evidence simply
does not include actual or potential catastrophes. Thus, where there is a sane possibility of such
catastrophes, such ‘evidence’ is statistically insigniﬁcant.
One can see all around us the evidence (!) of a world view that is not precautious, including in the
discussion of the greatest threat of all currently facing us: man-made climate change. It is to be
hoped that the precautionary principle can go a long way toward changing society’s attitude to
such potentially catastrophic problems and also toward forestalling further major problems that we
are not even aware of yet. Let us put it this way: without a precautionary ethic, the chances of
humanity lasting for the truly long term are, we suspect, grim, and slim. 
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